Dean Ball, member of the board of directors, The Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization, continues his focus on developments in artificial intelligence. Mr. Ball closely examines what the future may hold for all of us in a two-part essay for his online newsletter Hyperdimensional.

A former high-level staffer with the Hoover Institution and a research fellow specializing in AI at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, he asks what it will “feel like” to live in a society that has advanced AI. In Part One of “Where We Are Headed,” Mr. Ball seeks to understand this future by exploring the impact of AI “agents.”

Large language models, or “LLMs,” understand and generate human language, including texts. “Agents” will be LLMs that are configured to plan, reason, and perform intellectual work — “able to use, modify, and build software tools, obtain information from the internet,” and (via email, messaging apps, and chatbot interfaces) communicate with people and other AI agents. Such tasks are a very high percentage of what the average knowledge worker does — and AI agents will become increasingly good at their tasks, ranging from arithmetic to coding to writing legal briefs.

Corporations that use these agents “will have far greater capacity for intellectual labor,” Mr. Ball explains. “Teams of thousands of [AI] sales agents or coders will accomplish (some of) the firm’s work in far less time than was ever conceivable before; they will be able to do much more work as well.”

With the use of AI agents, companies will also become much more tightly controlled and unified. Human problems like misinterpretation or half-hearted implementation of executives’ orders will disappear for many business processes; for others, they will be significantly reduced. Firms and other organizations will certainly grow more efficient and profitable.

At the same time, Mr. Ball worries about opportunities for lower-level jobs in that new business environment. Eventually, managers will probably employ people for such work only in areas where, for example, they are legally required to do so; part of the job requires a human being, as in blue-collar work or activities like overseeing in-person events; or the applicant is of such high quality that managers wish to train him or her for higher-ranking positions.

Despite his largely positive attitude toward AI progress, Mr. Ball is concerned about its implications for employment. In this respect, “the blasé attitude of many libertarians strikes me as wide of the mark.” Millions of “young people who planned to enter high-paying knowledge work sectors could very well be starved of the opportunities for which they trained in school.”

It’s also unclear how this might be avoided or ameliorated: “I am aware of very few good policy proposals … to deal with [future] labor market turmoil … It is disheartening to imagine an infinitely scaleable machine outperforming you at something you care about, at a skill you honed … a talent in which you took pride.” And yet, saving jobs by means of AI regulatory laws “would come … at the expense of economic competitiveness.”

Even in a best-case artificial intelligence scenario, “Most of the thinking and doing in America will soon be done by machines, not people. I cannot tell you whether the dynamism that results will be fundamentally good or fundamentally bad, though history tells me it will be good.”

“But for those of us … living amid the transition, there will be a more personal truth with which to contend: Dynamism does not just mean saying hello. Dynamism also means saying goodbye.”