Dean Ball, a member of the board of directors at The Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization (AHI), specializes in artificial intelligence (AI). He writes a widely read column Hyperdimensional for Substack, an independent online publishing platform. In the November 14th issue “The Bitter Lessons,” Mr. Ball provides an expert overview in the contest for supremacy between China and the United States.

Mr. Ball spent more than two years immersed in the complex and fast-evolving field of AI. In addition, he had an exciting stint in the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy earlier this year. A 2014 graduate of Hamilton College and a former AHI Undergraduate Fellow, he has held a major position with the Hoover Institution and is now a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation. Mr. Ball questions the widespread concept of a “race” in AI as too simplistic.

A race has clear boundaries, he observed, and “a clearly defined finish line”—like our contest with the Soviet Union to be first on the moon, back in the 1960s. With AI, it is impossible to perceive “where we are headed” with any sense of reliability.

The United States does have a major advantage. It has rightly chosen to focus on the most human-like parts of AI—those closest to real human intelligence—rather than enhanced hardware like super-robots, as China has. America is stressing “Advanced AI,” also called “AGI” or artificial general intelligence. China emphasizes “Embodied AI.”

Mr. Ball remains confident on the U.S. strategy in this contest. “Our companies enjoy the lead in models, chips, and cloud computing infrastructure. But even more importantly, American firms are historically far better than Chinese firms at [the] complex software systems, financial engineering, and other technical and business mechanics required to market what will amount to a new kind of operating system to the world.”

The U.S. and China have deeply contrasting views of the AI competition. For America, as Mr. Ball sees it, the stress is on AI’s “deep learning” side. “Deep learning” means learning about things, situations, and problems from unstructured, not just highly structured, information—learning in a real-world manner, relatively like the brain.

“The U.S. economy,” he writes, “is increasingly a highly leveraged bet on deep learning. This has been true for a couple years now, though it is more explicit and extreme today … Most of this is because of decisions made by private actors (AI companies … banks and other large sources of capital, etc.), but … the policy and posture of the Trump Administration has heightened this dynamic as well.

Mr. Ball would bet on the U.S. economy run by deep learning. “It is … the most important macroinvention of our lifetime so far.”

Meanwhile “China’s AI strategy is based, it seems to me, on a few pillars.” Those are: 1) robotics, drones, self-driving cars, and other hardware; 2) a “fast-following” policy, meaning an emphasis on quick imitation of new AI developments that occur in the U.S. or elsewhere; and 3) shaping AI models to work in businesses, especially factories.

This strategy, Mr. Ball thinks, is sensible for China. Both countries seem to be following the AI approaches “that best suit their respective strengths. Advanced AI is [essentially a service, and is] delivered through high-end semiconductors, cloud computing platforms, charismatic user interfaces, and enabled by clever financial and legal engineering. Every one of those things is America’s … bread and butter.” In contrast: “Embodied AI is … enabled by mass manufacturing excellence, thick trade networks, and other characteristics that … tilt in China’s advantage.”

There is “no immediate fix” to America’s lagging status in manufacturing. “The only solution is … to re-build the manufacturing prowess it once enjoyed. This is underway, but it will take many years.”

Mr. Ball adds that one pillar of China’s AI strategy— “fast-following,” or imitation of American innovations—is “probably overrated.” But he concludes on a more troubling note:  If China does come to fully recognize the great importance of truly human rather than hardware-centric AI, “the world will be a much more dangerous place … It is therefore probably unhelpful for prominent Americans to say things like ‘our plan is to build AGI [artificial general intelligence] to gain a decisive military and economic advantage … and use that advantage to create a new world order permanently led by the U.S.’ Understandably, this tends to scare people, and it is also … a plan riddled with contestable presumptions …”